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OVERVIEW
International financial markets face an environment of monetary policy divergences and 
greater uncertainty over global growth, with a progressive increase in volatility. The 
scenario for the world economy is marked by a moderate pick-up in activity in the advanced 
regions and by the prolongation of the slowdown in the emerging economies. The defining 
features of the international setting in which Spanish deposit institutions are pursuing their 
activity are as follows: doubts concerning the Chinese economy, which affected stock 
markets in the form of increased volatility and heavy declines in share prices; uncertainty 
over the possible start of interest rate rises in the United States; the fall in commodities 
prices; and the low levels of inflation and nominal growth in the advanced economies and, 
in particular, in the euro area, entailing very low interest rates. 
In this setting, the year-on-year rate of credit to the resident private sector in Spain fell by 
4.5% in June 2015, meaning its rate of decline has continued to ease. The lower decline 
is due essentially to credit to non-financial corporations, which posted a lesser fall, in 
terms both of credit extended to property development and construction activities and to 
the other sectors. Non-performing loans continued to decline, and since early 2014 they 
have uninterruptedly posted negative month-on-month changes. The declining trend is 
extensive to households and non-financial corporations. The substantial fall in non-
performing loans translates into an improvement in the NPL ratio, which stood at 11.2% 
in August 2015. This reduction in NPLs is across the board and across every type of 
purpose of lending. 
Spanish deposit institutions’ total consolidated income increased in the first half of 2015 
compared with the previous year, with their ROE standing at 9.2%. The improvement was 
due both to an increase in net interest income and to a decline in asset impairment provisions. 
However, most of the improvement is mainly due to foreign business, since the return on 
domestic activity has been subject to various pressures: low interest rates in the euro area; 
the still-diminished dynamism of banking activity; and the still-high volumes of NPL. These 
factors explain why the profitability of domestic business remains far below the historical 
average, though it remains in line with that of our peer countries. 
With regard to banks’ solvency, their maximum-quality common equity Tier 1 (CET1) 
capital ratio has increased over the past year and stands in June at 12.4%, almost 1 pp up 
on twelve months earlier.
Accordingly, the Spanish banking sector has continued to increase its resilience to various 
shocks. That said, following the usual practice in other financial stability reports, this FSR 
focuses on the potential economic and financial developments that might adversely 
impact the stability of the Spanish banking system.
Specifically, this FSR identifies three main factors of risk (see Table 1). The first directly 
affects Spanish deposit institutions’ income statement. The other two may more indirectly 
impact Spanish banks’ financial position. In the current circumstances, the first risk is 
one of medium intensity (orange) while the other two are low-intensity risks (yellow). 
These risks are shared, to differing degrees of intensity, by other banking systems in the 
developed world and, in particular, by those belonging to the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM).
1 Key developments
2 Factors of risk
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The low interest rate environment, in response to a euro area inflation rate lower than the 
ECB objective, is exerting significant pressure on Spanish deposit institutions’ net interest 
income in their business in Spain. This is evident in Chart A, where the interest rate spread 
(difference between lending and deposit rates) is at historically very low levels of close to 
1%. Even though in recent quarters there has been some visible improvement in this 
margin, the sustainability over time of net interest income in situations like the present, 
where the rate spread is so small, depends largely on there being a sufficiently high level 
of business that enables the scant contribution of the income statement produced via 
prices to be offset via amounts.  That is not yet the case, as the total volume of lending and 
of bank deposits – the two biggest balance sheet items – continues to be seen to be 
declining. 
One factor adding further downward pressure on the profitability of banking business in 
Spain is the high relative volume of NPLs and foreclosed assets on institutions’ balance 
sheets. Chart B shows that both the NPL ratio and the absolute volume of NPLs in the 
form of lending to the resident private sector peaked in late 2013, having since initiated a 
declining trend. 
The risk to profitability is mitigated by the ongoing decline since 2013 in the volume of 
credit risk provisions set aside by banks, in line with the turnaround in NPLs further to the 
pick-up in economic activity in Spain. Moreover, the containment of costs helps counter 
the pressure bearing down on income statements in Spain. 
2.1  LOW PROFITABILITY OF BANKING 
BUSINESS IN SPAIN.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Colour ranking within the chart must be understood as follows: green colour shows a no-risk situation, yellow shows low risk, orange shows medium risk and red 
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1
Low projtability in the banking business in Spain, against a very low interest rate background, which may last in time, together with a still 
limited dinamism of the banking activity and with a high volume of NPLs, though declining.
2 Increase in the decelerating speed of emerging economies, especially where Spanish banks have partially their foreign exposure.
3 %inancial assets’ price correction, along with increases in the risk premium, both public and private.
RISK FACTORS (a) TABLE 1 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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The Spanish banking sector has moved forward from the very high losses it posted in 2012 
and has once again recorded positive and growing levels of ROE for business in Spain 
(around 5% in June 2015). That said, keeping ROE levels over time below the cost of 
capital poses a challenge to Spanish institutions, as it does for the European banking 
system as a whole. Under these conditions, banks will have to adjust their business model 
and, where necessary, their corporate strategy so as to adapt their organisation and 
structure to a highly demanding economic and regulatory environment. 
In recent years the emerging economies have undergone a gradual slowdown which, albeit 
at differing intensities in different regions, has been fairly widespread (see Chart C). This has 
been due not only to conjunctural factors but also to various trends, chiefly the lower growth 
of productivity and less favourable demographics, which are, at least in part, structural in 
nature. Given its growing weight in the global economy, the slowdown in China’s economy, 
immersed in a transition towards a new pattern of growth which, foreseeably, will lead to 
lower but more sustainable growth rates over time, has proven particularly significant. The 
recent turbulence originating on Chinese stock markets highlights the fact that this 
rebalancing process is not free from risks and may, at least temporarily, entail lower-than-
anticipated rates of increase in activity. 
Moreover, the emerging economies will foreseeably be affected, possibly for a prolonged 
period, by continuing low commodities prices (in the case of producers) and, in the shorter 
term, by the possible tightening of global financial conditions, which will accentuate the 
complexity of the adjustment for those economies which had seen a strong expansion in 
credit and investment during the cyclical upturn. Further, there are idiosyncratic elements 
in some of the main emerging economies (such as Brazil and Turkey) pointing in the same 
direction. Latin America is particularly sensitive to these developments given its trade ties 
with China, the significance of its commodities exports and its dependence on external 
financing. 
Generally, the possible step-up in the slowdown of the emerging economies poses a
significant risk for the global economy, especially if this disturbance is accompanied by 
corrections in financial asset prices. The potential effects on the Spanish economy would 
come about both through the trade channel and investor confidence, and also through the 
exposure of Spanish financial and non-financial corporations to the economies most affected.
That said, the impact of the weakening of the emerging economies has not so far had a 
significant impact on the results of Spanish banks present in these economies.
2.2  STEP-UP IN THE PACE 
OF THE SLOWDOWN 
IN THE EMERGING ECONOMIES.
SOURCE: International Monetary Fund.
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The future path of prices negotiated on national and international financial markets is 
subject to certain risks arising from corrections linked to differing shocks. At the international 
level, two scenarios that might trigger a potential correction in valuations may currently be 
identified. Firstly, a more-unfavourable-than-expected outlook for global growth and greater 
uncertainty over this outlook might raise agents’ risk-aversion, which would translate into 
an increase in both credit and markets risk premia. The likelihood of this scenario 
materialising has recently increased, as highlighted by the rise in volatility on international 
stock markets against the background of doubts over the scope of the slowdown in the
emerging economies. Secondly, a change in the course of the US monetary policy 
normalisation strategy, insofar as such policy is not sufficiently anticipated by the markets, 
might trigger a rise in volatility and an increase in the term premia implicit in long-term debt 
yields (see Charts D and E). In principle, however, a less adverse effect of this shock might 
be expected for financial stability in comparison with the previous scenario if the changes 
are not accompanied by a worsening of the global growth outlook. 
Alternatively, the correction of prices on financial markets might originate in a possible re-
emergence of tensions within the euro area, although progress in the institutional design 
of the euro area in recent years has increased the range of instruments available to face 
scenarios involving tensions on financial markets and has reduced the potential scope 
thereof, as illustrated by the experience with the Greek crisis last summer. Furthermore, 
following the agreements reached in July between Greece and its creditors, the risk of 
financial tensions in the euro area has abated.
Lastly, the correction of valuations on financial markets might also be domestic in origin and 
be associated with a loss of investor confidence in the Spanish economy’s ability to see 
through outstanding adjustments as a consequence, for example, of the perception of reform 
fatigue or of insufficient headway in restoring the main macro-financial and fiscal equilibria. 
The potential materialisation of any of these scenarios might have significant repercussions 
for the Spanish economy and for financial stability. First, a sharp correction in the
valuations prevailing on the markets might give rise to losses in the banking books of 
credit institutions and other intermediaries, but it might above all translate into a tightening 
of financing conditions, in a setting in which the improvement in these conditions has 
been contributing significantly to the economic recovery under way and in which the 
public and private sectors continue to hold high aggregate debt levels and evidence, 
2.3  CORRECTION TO THE PRICE 
OF FINANCIAL ASSETS.
SOURCES: Datastream and New York Federal Reserve.
a Spread calculated using Treasury zero-coupon curve (USA) and asset swaps (euro area and UK).
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therefore, sizable refinancing needs. To minimise the scope of these risks, and reduce 
their likelihood of occurring in the case of those that are domestic in origin, it is vital to 
continue striving to improve the structural functioning of the Spanish economy and to 
ensure compliance as scheduled with the fiscal consolidation path. 
The three aforementioned risks are set out in greater detail in the course of this Report. In 
any event, given the satisfactory position of solvency generally maintained by Spanish 
banks following the increase in their capital ratios in recent years, the sector is suitably 
positioned to meet the challenges indicated and the risks described are thus not expected 
to have an immediate and significant influence on Spanish banks’ situation. 
Chapter 3 sets out the treatment of deferred tax assets under current tax and banking 
solvency regulations. It further describes the legislative changes recently introduced with 
a view to dispelling any possible uncertainty over the compatibility of Spanish rules and 
the European legal framework in respect of State aid.
3 Other matters

BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2015
1 MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report in May, international financial 
markets have reflected a scenario of greater uncertainty, linked initially to the negotiations 
between Greece and its creditors, and subsequently to developments on the emerging 
markets. This latter factor of risk heightened in August, following the growing doubts 
about the Chinese economy, which prompted increases in volatility and heavy falls in 
equity market prices. A higher level of volatility than in the past continued to be seen 
on non-stock markets, but without rises on the scale recorded on stock markets. Against 
this background, financial markets appear to be adapting to an environment in which 
divergences in the monetary policy stance of some of the main central banks are 
expected to widen and in which doubts over global growth are heightening, with a 
progressive increase in volatility and less appetite for risk. Uncertainty over the start 
of the process of interest rate rises by the US Federal Reserve are also contributing to 
this climate. 
On the emerging markets, the level of uncertainty increased to a greater degree and in a 
more generalised fashion, since the repercussions of the developments in the Chinese 
market are more immediate and the effect that any future rise in US interest rates may 
have is more marked. Further, the appreciation of the dollar tends to make debt service 
and refinancing by companies in those countries that resorted to dollar funding more 
expensive. 
The current macroeconomic scenario for the global economy is characterised by a
moderate recovery in activity in the main advanced regions (still weak in some cases, such 
as in the euro area and Japan) and by the continuation of the slowdown in the emerging 
economies. Various factors are contributing to this latter development, some of which 
structural, and some such as the prolonged reduction in commodities prices, which is 
acutely affecting the activity of the commodities exporting countries. 
Inflation in the advanced economies has continued falling, standing at very low levels 
and, generally, clearly below central banks’ medium-term targets. The pace of price 
increases has also held low in a good number of the emerging economies (especially in 
Asia and Europe), although in other cases, such as Latin America, Russia and Turkey, 
there has been considerable downward stickiness, partly as a result of the depreciation 
of these countries’ currencies. Significantly, the room available for macroeconomic 
policies in these economies to withstand a more unfavourable environment is less than in 
previous episodes. 
With a view to the coming quarters, the baseline scenario envisages a continuation of 
recent trends, with an appreciable increase in the overall level of uncertainty. For the 
advanced economies as a whole a modest increase in growth is expected, assisted by low 
commodities prices (of which these countries are net importers) and favourable financing 
conditions. In the case of the emerging economies the projections are more heterogeneous, 
but part of a general pattern of weakening in which the slowdown in the Chinese economy, 
continuing low commodities prices and the incipient tightening of global financial 
conditions have been particularly influential. This aforementioned tightening might hamper 
the ongoing adjustment of those economies where lending and investment most grew in 
the previous cyclical upturn. 
1.1  External environment 
of the euro area
International financial markets 
reflected heightening 
uncertainty…
… that was greater on the 
emerging markets,...
… against a background 
of weak global economic 
growth… 
…and low inflation rates 
in the advanced and emerging 
economies alike
The baseline scenario 
envisages recent trends 
holding…
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The main risks to this baseline scenario for the international economy and financial markets 
are of two types. The first refers to the potential scope of the slowdown in the emerging 
economies, which appears to have stepped up in recent months. The second relates to a 
possible sharp correction in financial asset prices. These risks, which are analysed in detail 
below, are not mutually exclusive, and a scenario in which both materialise together cannot 
be ruled out. 
A common feature shared by a good number of the emerging economies is the progressive 
slowdown in their economic activity in recent years, with the positive growth differential 
they had maintained vis-à-vis the advanced economies having narrowed significantly. 
Broadly, the growth rate in this group of countries is increasingly lower and in each new 
forecasting exercise the projections have been successively cut (see Chart E in the 
Overview). This correction is not purely conjunctural, since the estimates of potential 
growth also suggest diminished dynamism which, overall, is associated with lower 
productivity gains and the – more incipient – emergence of demographic problems, along 
with certain idiosyncratic elements in some cases. These factors are starting to influence 
international investors’ spirits and analysts’ and rating agencies’ assessments, which may 
ultimately bear down on capital flows towards these economies. 
Given its growing weight in and its impact on the global economy, the loss of momentum 
of the Chinese economy is particularly significant. China is immersed in a transition 
towards a growth model more geared towards consumption which, foreseeably, will lead 
to lower but more sustainable growth rates over time (see Box 1.1). The recent tensions 
originating on Chinese stock markets highlight the fact that this re-balancing process, 
which requires the implementation of numerous reforms, including moves towards greater 
financial liberalisation, is not free from risks. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that, at least 
temporarily, this process may give rise to lower-than-expected growth rates, which would 
have a bearing on global growth and, in particular, on that of other emerging economies.
… and the main risks refer 
to the slowdown in the 
emerging economies 
and a possible correction 
of financial asset prices
The slowdown in the emerging 
economies might be sharper 
than anticipated in the 
baseline scenario…
… owing particularly to 
the loss of momentum 
of the Chinese economy 
BOX 1.1THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN IN CHINA
The Chinese economy is currently undergoing a process of 
rebalancing. The aim is to maintain the convergence in living 
standards, while ensuring their sustainability, through a shift away 
from investment, which is high but the productivity of which is low, 
and exports, towards consumption. This requires, in turn, the 
implementation of structural reforms, which have uncertain effects 
in the short term, especially when introduced in a context of
slowing activity, with significant levels of corporate debt and 
excess capacity in certain sectors.  
One of the key elements of this process has been financial reform, 
which seeks to give greater importance to the market. Against this 
background, various measures were adopted between November 
2014 and June 2015 to open up the stock market to a larger number 
of investors, especially domestic ones, but also to external investors, 
with a connection between the Hong Kong and Shanghai markets. 
As a consequence of this process the Shanghai stock market 
rose spectacularly (see Chart A), with clear signs of over-valuation. 
This led to an initial reaction by the authorities, in April, when they 
announced a tightening of the rules on securities lending, which 
was playing a fundamental role in the boom. As a result, expectations 
of future prices were revised, triggering a rapid decline that gathered 
pace during June and early July. Again the authorities intervened, 
this time to slow the falls. The strength of their action, which 
included not only reductions in reference interest rates and cash 
ratios, but also direct share purchases on the market, extraordinary 
funding for brokers and diverse restrictions on share selling, led to 
doubts regarding the authorities’ capacity for action and the extent 
of the economic slowdown in China. Subsequently, in mid-August, 
against a background of sharply falling exports, the Chinese central 
bank modified the system for setting the central parity against 
the US dollar (see Chart B), which led to a 3% devaluation of the 
renminbi. This, along with a sequence of worse-than-expected 
data, revived the uncertainty and led to another severe stock market 
correction, on this occasion with international contagion, and further 
intervention by the authorities. Later, in October, the authorities 
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Against this background of slowing growth in China and falls in commodities prices, 
economic activity in Latin America has since 2011 been decelerating markedly, following 
a boom decade. These external shocks have highlighted the domestic weaknesses of the 
economies in the region. Some countries face a delicate situation of recession and high 
inflation, with little room for manoeuvre for economic policy-making.
Such is the case of Brazil, where cyclical weakness has stepped up as a consequence of 
the need to apply macroeconomic adjustment policies to correct the imbalances built up 
during the upturn, in particular the budget deficit, the external deficit and inflation. The 
outlook for this country points to a significant contraction in activity over the rest of 2015, 
against a backdrop of fiscal adjustment, exacerbated by political tensions (as already 
prompted by one agency’s downgrading of the country’s rating to below investment 
grade), a harsher monetary policy and a relatively unfavourable international environment, 
which includes a tightening of international financing conditions. The exchange rate, which 
has depreciated by 50% in real effective terms since 2011, is acting as an initial adjustment 
The domestic weaknesses in 
the Latin American economies 
have been highlighted by 
the recent external shocks 
The outlook for Brazil points 
to a significant contraction 
in activity in 2015
reduced reference interest rates and cash ratios further, while 
pressing ahead with financial reform by liberalising deposit rates.
There are three direct channels through which lower growth in the 
Chinese economy may be passed through to the global economy: 
the trade channel, the commodity price channel and the direct 
financial channel. With respect to the trade channel, the rest of Asia 
and Oceania are the most exposed regions. Latin America is also 
significantly exposed to this channel, since China is the main 
importer of commodities, but more important is the impact through 
the reduction in the prices of these products, which may be 
accompanied by an increase in external and budgetary imbalances 
and a reduction in foreign investment. Within the euro area, Germany, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands are China’s main trading partners, 
while direct exports from Spain represent less than 1.5% of the total, 
although Spanish exposure through third countries in the euro area 
may be higher. The direct financial channel is rather limited given 
that the financial markets in China remain relatively closed and the
cross-border banking positions, despite being relatively large 
according to the BIS statistics, represent a small proportion of the 
total for the most exposed advanced economies (United Kingdom 
12%, Japan 5% and United States 4%). The Spanish exposure is 
$10 billion (less than 1% of the total). 
The available estimates suggest that a gradual moderate slowdown in 
the Chinese economy, like the one envisaged in the central scenario, 
would have limited effects through the trade channel (strongest in the 
case of the Asian economies) and through the one that operates via 
commodity prices (with the most pronounced effects in this case on 
the exporters of such products), and a very limited direct financial 
impact.1 However, if the slowdown in the Chinese economy is sharper 
than anticipated and persistent, the indirect financial channels — 
principally contagion through greater risk aversion or a deterioration in 
confidence — could be more important.
BOX 1.1THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN IN CHINA (cont’d)
1  See, for example, Banco de España (2015): “Transmisión internacional del 
reequilibrio económico de China”, the second box of the Quarterly report on 
the Spanish economy, Boletín Económico, Banco de España, September.
SOURCES: CEIC and Datastream. 
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mechanism, although its corrective effect on the current deficit is still limited and, by 
contrast, it is exerting some pressure on the inflation rate. Foreseeably, next year will see 
a greater effect by the currency’s depreciation on external demand and an improvement in 
private consumption, arising from the reduction in inflation, which will soften the decline 
in activity. In the medium term, it is to be expected that the macroeconomic adjustment 
under way will ultimately restore equilibrium to the Brazilian economy, although all forecasts 
suggest a further adjustment of activity in 2016. In any event, the country also enjoys 
significant strengths, such as a high level of international reserves, an appropriate 
macroeconomic policy framework and a healthy banking system with high levels of 
solvency, liquidity and profitability, and a low level of NPLs.
The effect of the external shocks is not confined to Latin America, but extends to other 
emerging economies with some type of vulnerability. This is the case of Turkey, where 
economic fragility is compounded by tensions in the political realm. On the economic 
front, the Turkish current-account deficit has been high in recent years (5.8% of GDP in 
2014), which has led to a significant increase in its external debt. External financing largely 
comprises short-term capital flows, which makes the country particularly sensitive to a 
potential reversal of such flows, to a rise in financing costs or to an excessive depreciation 
of the lira. External funding is routed through the Turkish banking system which, therefore, 
poses a high credit risk, derived from non-financial corporations’ foreign currency 
exposure. That said, the banking system’s solvency and profit ratios are sound, default 
levels are low and public finances are very healthy.
Recent months have seen a rise in volatility on the main financial markets. As can be seen 
in Chart 1.1, the volatility of exchange rates has increased gradually since late 2014; but 
uncertainty has also fed through to the bond markets, with a slight and progressive rise in 
the implied volatility on US government debt markets at different maturities. More recently, 
since August 2015, there has been a strong increase in volatility in equity indices.
Against this background, larger-scale and longer-lasting adjustments in financial asset 
prices cannot be ruled out, and they may be amplified should liquidity problems arise on 
secondary markets. This might ultimately impact financial institutions’ income statements 
and their funding costs, with unfavourable consequences for the spending and investment 
decisions of households and non-financial corporations.
The recent increase in volatility appears to be in response to doubts over the ability 
gradually to implement change in the monetary conditions in certain countries, in particular 
The effect of the external 
shocks extends to other 
emerging economies such 
as Turkey, where economic 
fragility is exacerbated 
by political tensions
Financial markets posted 
discrete and frequent rises 
in volatility
Against this background, 
larger-scale adjustments 
in financial asset prices 
cannot be ruled out
The recent increase in volatility 
is in response to various...
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
Jan-13 Mar-13 May-13 Jul-13 Sep-13 Nov-13 Jan-14 Mar-14 May-14 Jul-14 Sep-14 Nov-14 Jan-15 Mar-15 May-15 Jul-15 Sep-15 
 VIX (S&P 500)  BONDS (MOVE INDEX)  US DOLLAR / EURO 
  
  
% 
IMPLICIT VOLATILITIES CHART  1.1
SOURCE: Datastream.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2015
the United States, and to the downward revision of global growth expectations. Both 
factors might ultimately trigger episodes of asset price corrections. In any event, the 
sharpness of the oscillations will depend on market characteristics. In those markets with 
a lower level of liquidity (such as the corporate bond market), or with operational constraints 
(as is the case with some of China’s stock markets), rises in volatility in the face of adverse 
surprises may be more acute than before the crisis. There might also be upward adjustments 
in the credit risk premia of certain instruments that are currently at low levels, as is the case 
with corporate debt (see Chart 1.2.A for the United States), or the implied term premia on 
the government debt yields of the main developed economies (see Chart D of the Overview 
for the United States). The equity markets also reflect this greater uncertainty, as evidenced 
by the severe correction the main stock market indices underwent in August and September 
in the advanced and emerging economies alike (see Chart 1.2.B).
International bank funding markets are no less affected by these circumstances. Chart E 
in the Overview shows how, following several years of declines, bank debt spreads have 
gradually increased across the board since summer 2014, more sharply so in the case of 
the United States. The greater rise in the US spread might be due to idiosyncratic factors, 
such as the effect of sanctions and fines for various instances of fraud, or slowing profits 
from investment banking activities. In any event, it cannot be ruled out that, in the current 
context of greater risk aversion, there may also be significant corrections in these 
markets.
Developments on euro area financial markets in the final stretch of Q2 were marked by 
the difficult negotiation of the agreement to extend a third support package for Greece. 
This episode gave rise to increases in volatility, stock market price declines and increases 
in the sovereign debt yields of certain countries with respect to Germany. That said, 
contagion to the rest of the euro area was contained, especially when compared with the 
market reaction in previous episodes. Among other factors, headway in recent years in 
governance and in the development of new crisis-management instruments in the euro 
area were no doubt a contributing factor here. Following the signing of the agreement 
between the Greek authorities and the credit institutions, on 12 July, the previous
movements tended to be reversed, although subsequently European markets were 
adversely affected by the global factors mentioned in the foregoing section. More recently, 
asset prices have tended to rise, a development partly related to expectations over further 
expansionary measures by the ECB.
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Overall, from late April to late October, stock market indices posted moderate declines and 
the average premia on the CDSs of financial and non-financial corporations rose slightly. 
Much of the previous increase in 10-year sovereign bond yields has recently been 
corrected, whereby they still stand at levels slightly up on those in late April.
The credit risk indicators in respect of corporate and sovereign bonds are close to the lowest 
levels of recent years, albeit clearly above those of the period in the run-up to the onset of the 
crisis in 2007. From that standpoint, these premia would not seem to be exceptionally low. On 
euro area stock markets, the valuation measures that take into account the business cycle 
juncture, such as the cyclically adjusted price/earnings ratio, do not show clear signs of 
overvaluation. By contrast, the estimates available on the term premia on public debt suggests 
that, despite having recently risen, they are currently at historically low levels, a development 
that may be partly related to the Eurosystem’s non-standard expansionary monetary policy.
Financing conditions remain favourable. In particular, on the credit market, the interest 
rates applied by banks to customers – on the latest information available, for August – 
were at historically low levels. Dispersion across countries has fallen significantly since the 
announcement of the new Eurosystem policy measures in June 2014.
The latest available information on euro area GDP growth shows a quarter-on-quarter increase, 
in 2015 Q1 and Q2, of 0.5% and 0.4%, respectively (see Chart 1.3.A). Inflation, measured by 
the year-on-year rate of change in the HICP, returned to negative figures in September (–0.1%), 
after several months of positive rates, owing to the recent fall in energy goods prices.
The latest ECB forecasts (September) point to a continuation of the gradual recovery in 
economic activity and to inflation rates progressively drawing closer to their medium-/long-
term objective. However, the greater uncertainty prompted by recent developments in the 
emerging markets led the ECB to revise its outlook for both growth and prices slightly 
downwards and, above all, to signal the presence of predominantly downside risks in the 
case of both variables with respect to their baseline scenario. The latest available information 
appears to confirm these risks. 
Against this background, the ECB Governing Council reiterated on 3 September its 
intention to maintain its asset purchase programmes under the initially announced monthly 
volume and duration terms, and it further recalled the flexibility at its disposal to adjust, 
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where appropriate, the volume, composition and duration of the programmes, evidencing 
its readiness and ability to act if required.1 Subsequently, in the statement for the meeting 
on 22 October, it recalled its readiness to use, where necessary, all the monetary policy 
instruments at its disposal.
From the standpoint of financial stability analysis, the main aggregate risks are qualitatively 
similar to those previously indicated in the context of the external setting of the euro area. 
Moreover, as a factor of risk of particular interest to the euro area, the potential negative 
impact that a less favourable global setting may have on long-term inflation expectations 
should be highlighted. In this respect, the lower nominal growth that would ensue in a 
scenario of less buoyant activity and very low inflation would tend to slow the rate of correction 
of the debt levels of those agents (public and private alike) that are still in a vulnerable financial 
position, which might bear down adversely on investor confidence.
Any future sharp correction of prices on financial markets, whether because of factors 
external to the euro area (such as those linked to an increase in risk aversion on international 
markets) or internal factors (such as a possible downturn in confidence within the euro area), 
would entail rather significant risks for the euro area economy, as it would involve a tightening 
of financing conditions. In a risk scenario of these characteristics, any future tightening on 
financial markets might exert an adverse impact on the area’s economic prospects along 
with asymmetric effects that would compound such impact, with a particularly significant 
effect on those agents or economies in a situation of greater financial vulnerability and/or 
with greater macroeconomic imbalances.
In Spain, developments on domestic financial markets were, in general, in line with those 
in the rest of the area, although the rise in average 5-year CDS premia in the case of 
financial and non-financial corporations was somewhat higher in Spain (around 30 bp, 
compared with 0-20 bp on average in the euro area). Spanish 10-year government bond 
spread over the German benchmark rose above all at times of high tension, although it 
subsequently turned down, returning in late October to levels similar to those in late April 
(around 115 bp). The Ibex 35, for its part, fell 8% during this period.
Underpinned above all by national demand, Spanish GDP posted significant positive 
growth in quarter-on-quarter terms in the first two quarters of 2015, of 0.9% and 1%, 
respectively, placing the year-on-year growth rate in Q2 at 3.1%. On the latest available 
information, a slight containment of the pace of output is expected to have begun in Q3, 
as a result of the progressive exhaustion of some of the factors which, temporarily, 
forcefully drove national demand during the final stretch of 2014 and the first half of 2015. 
As regards prices, on the latest available provisional data the year-on-year rate of change 
of the CPI stood at –0.7% in October, a fall chiefly due to the behaviour of energy prices. 
The latest projections published by the Banco de España, in late September, point to 
average GDP growth in the baseline scenario of 3.1% for 2015 as a whole, whereas a 
somewhat more moderate rate of increase is expected in 2016 (2.7%; see Chart 1.3.B). On 
the prices front, the CPI is expected to rise slightly at the end of this year and thus embark 
on a path of gradual increases over the course of 2016, which would nonetheless be 
compatible with moderate inflation rates for the year as a whole.
Currently, the main risks 
in the euro area are: a less-
favourable-than-expected 
macroeconomic picture 
globally…
… and a possible sharp 
correction of prices 
on financial markets
1.3  The Spanish 
economy
As in the euro area, corporate 
credit risk premia rose and 
stock market prices fell on 
domestic financial markets
The significant growth rate 
of economic activity began 
to show signs of easing in Q3 
and inflation turned negative 
again owing to the effect 
of oil prices
1  The ECB further decided to raise, in general terms, the ceiling on the securities of each individual issue that may be 
acquired by the Eurosystem, from 25% to 33%. This measure contributes to heightening the potential headroom 
for extending the programme where necessary.
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The risks to this scenario largely coincide with those indicated for the euro area. In this 
respect, the Spanish economy is particularly vulnerable to a scenario of lower nominal 
growth in the euro area, insofar as this would hamper seeing through the adjustments 
outstanding in respect of the main macro-financial imbalances. In particular, despite the 
fact the ongoing deleveraging of households and non-financial corporations is at a very 
advanced stage, the debt of these sectors remains high and still above the euro area 
average (see Chart 1.4.A). The budget deficit has diminished notably in recent years, but it 
is still at levels that entail sizeable financial needs on the part of overall general government, 
whose debt ratio has begun to show signs of stabilising, although its current level is very 
high (see Chart 1.4.B).
Against this backdrop, a possible tightening of financing conditions might significantly 
affect the Spanish economy, given the still-high financing requirements for the nation as a 
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whole. Indeed, at present the nation’s debtor position vis-à-vis the rest of the world is 
somewhat over 90% of GDP, far above that of the core euro area economies. It is worth 
recalling that the generalised improvement in the Spanish economy’s financing conditions 
has been one of the main contributing factors to the economic recovery under way. Thus, 
since coming to a head in mid-2012, the financial fragmentation problems in the euro area 
have abated significantly in Spain’s case, meaning that private-sector financing costs have 
tended to converge towards the levels prevailing in the core euro area economies (see 
Chart 1.5). This is largely the result of the application of a highly expansionary monetary 
policy by the ECB, but also of the reforms undertaken domestically, along with the progress 
in terms of the economic and monetary union. This suggests that a substantial part of the 
recent improvement in our economy’s financial position is structural in nature and, therefore, 
it may be expected to last over time. Even so, a possible deterioration in domestic financial 
conditions resulting from factors external to our country, such as those described above, or 
from idiosyncratic elements cannot be ruled out. Among the idiosyncratic elements, 
mention should be made of the risk of potential bouts of losses in investor confidence 
arising from doubts over the country’s capacity to carry out the adjustments still outstanding, 
as regards both restoring the main macro-financial equilibria and bringing about structural 
improvement in the functioning of factor and product markets.
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2 BANKING RISKS, PROFITABILITY AND SOLVENCY
Lending
The consolidated total assets of Spanish deposit institutions, which include both their 
business in Spain and that of their subsidiaries and branches abroad, amounted to €3,662 
billion in June 2015. They thus grew by 3.6% year on year (see Table 2.1), continuing the 
upward trend initiated in December 2014. This growth reflected the performance of 
business abroad, where total assets in June 2015 were up by 17.8% on the same month 
a year earlier. In Spain, however, business contracted by 2.9% in year-on-year terms, 
compared with a decline of 8.8% a year earlier.
These developments meant that the weight of business abroad in the total business of 
Spanish deposit institutions, measured in terms of assets, amounted to 35.9%, up more 
than 4 pp on the same month a year earlier. Behind this change is not only the performance 
of the banking business itself, but also the behaviour of exchange rates. Particular mention 
should be made of the greater importance of Spanish banks’ business in the United 
Kingdom and the USA (see Chart 2.1.A) and of the euro’s depreciation against the 
currencies of these countries by 11.2% and 18%, respectively.
Also, Spanish banks operate abroad through financially autonomous subsidiaries engaging 
mainly in local retail banking in local currency (see Chart 2.1.B), which significantly reduces 
the risks derived from such operations. Moveover, from the standpoint of credit risk, at June 
2015 the total non-performing loans ratios1 associated with the credit granted in these 
countries remained steady, standing substantially below 2% in the United Kingdom and the 
USA (see Chart 2.1.C). This non-performing loans ratio has behaved favourably in both these 
countries, in line with the macroeconomic trend analysed in Chapter 1 (see Chart 2.1.D). 
Spanish banks’ exposure to China is scarcely 0.4% of their total assets abroad, and is 
divided in similar proportions between business in local currency and that in non-local 
currency. Therefore, the tensions stemming from movements in the value of the yuan and 
the possible deceleration of the Chinese economy have a very limited direct effect on 
Spanish banks’ balance sheets. Further, the entry into recession of Brazil, one of the main 
sources of risk in emerging countries as explained in Chapter 1, does not yet seem to have 
had an impact on the non-performing loans ratio.
Financing to the private sector, which includes credit and debt securities, grew by 3.2% 
year-on-year as at June 2015. In terms of total assets, it rose from 61.4% at June 2014 to 
61.1% a year later. The change in credit to the private sector resulted from the notable 
growth (by nearly 20%) of banks’ business abroad, in contrast to the moderate decrease 
in Spain. As mentioned above, the behaviour of exchange rates in the past year has 
significantly affected the performance of business abroad.
Financing to general government (credit and fixed income) posted a year-on-year increase of 
6.4% at June 2015, which raised its weight in the balance sheet by 0.4 pp to 15.1% in the 
past year. This increase took place both in business in Spain (2%) and, more sharply, in 
2.1 Banking risks
2.1.1 CREDIT RISK
The consolidated balance 
sheet as at June 2015 grew 
owing to business abroad, 
partly as a result of exchange 
rates
The financial autonomy of 
subsidiaries abroad means 
that the risk associated with 
this business is limited
The tension in China and 
Brazil has not so far had a 
significant effect on bank 
balance sheets
Financing to the private 
sector, which includes credit 
and debt securities, grew by 
3.2% year-on-year as at 
June 2015
Financing to general 
government grew by 6.4%, 
and its weight in the balance 
sheet increased
1  In addition to credit and NPLs to the resident private sector, this figure includes those to general government and 
credit institutions.
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business abroad (21.3%). In terms of total assets, financing to general government amounted 
to 15.1%, this weight having risen in recent years, particularly in business in Spain. Since the 
beginning of the crisis, financing to general government has gained weight in terms of total 
assets, while financing to the private sector has lost weight. This trend can be expected to 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including valuation adjustments, are included in "Other".
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reverse as the economic recovery moves onto a firmer footing and credit to the private 
sector increases. However, given the high weight which financing to general government 
currently has in bank balance sheets, a sudden significant incrase in sovereign debt yields, 
which is a risk identified in the analysis of Chapter 1, would have a negative impact on banks.
Analysis of banking business in Spain shows a year-on-year decrease in credit to the private 
sector of 4.5% at June 2015 for deposit institutions as a whole (see Chart 2.2.A). This 
continues the trend of recent quarters in which the volume of credit has been decreasing, 
although at a progressively slower pace (the year-on-year rate of change of credit at June 
2014 was –7.8% and at December 2014 it was –6.4%). This smaller fall in credit was 
widespread across banks (see Chart 2.2.B). The most recent monthly data, relating to 
August, point to a further continuation of this trend, with a year-on-year decrease of 4.4%.
The latest available quarterly data show a year-on-year fall of 5.7% in the volume of credit 
to non-financial corporations at June 2015, which is a significant improvement on the drop 
of 9.7% a year earlier. The decrease in credit for real estate and construction activities was 
14.9% year on year at June 2015, compared with a fall of 16.7% a year earlier. The decline 
in other sectors was 0.5%, compared with 4.7% at June 2014. Meanwhile, household 
credit at June 2015 showed a year-on-year decrease of 5%, this decline being 5.3% in 
lending for house purchases and 3.3% in that for other purposes.
Credit to the resident private 
sector in Spain continued to 
fall in 2015, albeit more slowly 
than in the previous year… 
…due to the slower 
contraction in that to 
non-financial corporations…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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This less negative behaviour in credit to non-financial corporations for purposes other than 
construction and real estate activities was generally and markedly appreciable across the 
various sectors of activity (see Chart 2.2.C), some of which, such as the primary sector, 
even posted positive rates of change. 
The approval rate of the loans which non-financial corporations request from banks with 
which they are not working or with which they have not had a credit relationship in the 
preceding few months steadied at around 37%, far from the approval rates in the period 
of strong credit growth and those in the period of prolonged steep contraction in economic 
and credit activity (see Chart 2.3.A). The rate of change of loan applications continued to 
decelerate, although more slowly than in previous months, while the growth of approvals 
lost momentum. Meanwhile, the trend in construction and real estate development sector 
is holding firm and approval rates continue to increase.
Chart 2.3.C shows the behaviour of new mortgage loans for house purchase over a long 
time period. This chart plots the volume of new credit (annual flow) and the volume of total 
mortgage credit (stock at December each year), both with base 100 from the first year that 
…across the board…
… while the growth of the loan 
approval rate steadied
New mortgage loans for 
house purchase stopped 
falling in 2013…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Includes securitizations.
b The graph shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the year-on-year rate of change of credit for deposit institutions. This density function 
is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous and smoothed graphical 
representation of that function.
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information is available (2002), and the flow of mortgage credit as a percentage of stock. 
It shows that the flow of mortgage credit peaked in 2006 and fell continuously until 2013. 
In 2014 there was a slight recovery. Also shown is the fall in the stock of mortgage credit 
since 2010. Lastly, the weight of new loans in total credit decreases significantly, since in 
the initial years of the series it is around 30% and in the final years it is about 3%.
Chart 2.3.C clearly shows the swings of the credit cycle in Spain over the past decade. The 
excessive credit growth caused an unsustainable expansion of the housing market, the 
collapse of which had an adverse impact on banks and on the Spanish economy as a 
whole. At prudential policy level, this highlights the need for tools able to smooth the credit 
cycle and leading indicators for early assessment of risks and vulnerabilities.
In the first half of 2015 interest rates on new loans by Spanish deposit institutions continued 
on the moderate downward path initiated in 2014, reflecting a relative improvement in 
credit conditions available to households and non-financial corporations (see Chart 2.3.B). 
The difference between the interest rates charged to non-financial corporations on new 
loans of more than €1 million and on those of less than €1 million has decreased in the year 
elapsed so far, owing to the larger reduction in rates on smaller loans.
…and have been increasing 
since 2014
The cost of new lending by 
banks continued its moderate 
decline…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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This decrease in interest rates, particularly those charged to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (loans of less than €1 million), ran parallel to the decrease in the risk premium 
on sovereign bonds and on bank financing, so that the improvement in the financing 
conditions of the Spanish economy on the international markets has spread to the private 
sector. In any event, as pointed out in Chapter 1, if there were a sustained change in the 
trend of the risk premium on these markets, that increase would foreseeably feed through 
to the cost of credit to households and firms, posing a risk to the recovery of credit growth 
and to the firming of the recovery of the Spanish economy.
Non-performing loans
Returning to the information shown in Table 2.1, total non-performing loans2 decreased 
year-on-year by 16.8% as at June 2015, taking their weight in the balance sheet from 6% 
at June 2014 to 4.9% a year later. This improvement in non-performing loans resulted from 
developments in business in Spain, where total non-performing loans decreased by 19.6% 
at June 2015, in line with the significant recovery of economic activity noted in Chapter 1. 
Total non-performing loans in business abroad rose by 5.1%, substantially less than total 
assets, so their weight in the balance sheet also fell.
The decrease in non-performing loans, along with the slight growth in total credit, which 
includes that granted to the private sector, to general government and to credit institutions, 
whether resident or non-resident, prompted a year-on-year decline of 137 bp in the total 
non-performing loans ratio at consolidated level to 5.9% as at June 2015. This non-
performing loans ratio represents an improvement of 1.8 pp with respect to the peak of the 
series in December 2013. The non-performing loans ratio of the resident private sector 
performed similarly to the total NPL ratio in the past year. 
The decrease in non-performing loans of Spanish deposit institutions was accompanied 
by a drop in provisions for loan losses and country risk, which showed a year-on-year rate 
of change of –14% as at June 2015 (see Table 2.1). This meant that the weight in total 
assets of this item decreased from 3.5% at June 2014 to 2.9% at June 2015. 
Non-performing loans to the resident private sector in business in Spain continued the 
decline seen in the last few quarters. In particular, between August 2014 and August 2015 
(latest available data) they decreased by €37 billion (–20.4% year on year) for deposit 
institutions as a whole. The monthly change in non-performing loans shows negative 
figures in all months from the beginning of 2014 to date without exception (see Charts 
2.4.A and B). 
Analysis by institutional sector (see Chart 2.4.C) shows that the decrease in non-performing 
loans in the past year is apparent both in credit to households and in that to non-financial 
corporations. The year-on-year fall of 18.2% in NPLs to households contrasts with the 
growth of 10.9% as at June 2014. For their part, non-financial corporations reduced their 
non-performing loans by 20.7%, compared with NPL growth of 3.9% as at the same 
month of the previous year.
Analysis by loan purpose shows that non-performing loans to households fell similarly in 
credit for house purchase and in other lending (decrease of somewhat more than 18%). 
… in parallel with the decrease 
in the risk premium on 
sovereign bonds 
Non-performing loans fell 
due to business in Spain…
…which, together with 
the behaviour of credit, 
prompted a decrease 
in the total non-performing 
loans ratio 
Also, provisions for loan 
losses and country risk fell, 
due partly to the decrease 
in non-performing loans
Non-performing loans 
to the resident private 
sector in Spain continued 
to decrease
In the household sector, NPLs 
fell in house purchase credit 
and in other lending…
2  See footnote on the first page of this chapter.
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In both cases there was a notable improvement with respect to the previous year, when 
non-performing loans grew by 12.2% in the case of house purchase credit and by 7.3% in 
other household lending. 
Non-performing loans to non-financial corporations decreased both in construction and 
real estate activities (–26.8% as at June 2015) and in other activities (–11.7%). In both 
cases the improvement is notable compared with the previous year. Within firms engaging 
in other than construction and real estate activities, the decrease in non-performing loans, 
as well as their faster rate of fall, was apparent in all economic sectors. Box 2.1 analyses 
the behaviour of non-performing loans by size of borrower firm, paying special attention to 
developments in SMEs.
It should also be noted that the sharp fall in non-performing loans between June 2014 and 
June 2015 took place at at all institutions, with a smaller dispersion at the latter date (see 
Chart 2.4.D). 
… while NPLs to 
firms decreased both in 
construction and real estate 
activities and in other sectors
Non-performing loans 
decreased at all institutions…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The transfers to Sareb by Group 1 and Group 2 banks in December 2012 and February 2013 affect the changes in those periods.
b The graph shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the year-on-year rate of change of credit for Spanish deposit institutions. This density function 
is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous and smoothed graphical 
representation of that function.
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NPLs decreased over the year to June 2015, for large firms (-32.9%) 
and for SMEs1 (-14.8%) and sole proprietorships (-10.1%). Among 
SMEs, the largest decrease was recorded for microenterprises 
(-18.4%), followed by medium-sized enterprises (-16.8%) and 
small enterprises (-7.4%)(see Chart A). Developments in the credit 
and NPLs of SMEs over the year to June 2015 resulted in a decline 
of more than 4 percentage points in their NPL ratio, from 28.1% in 
June 2014 to 23.9%. Even so, SMEs continue to have a higher NPL 
ratio than large firms, whose ratio also fell during the same period, 
from 18.1% to 13.9% in June 2015 (see Chart B). Breaking down 
the credit quality of SMEs, all the size categories recorded a fall in 
the NPL ratio over the year to June 2015. Moreover, size and NPL 
ratios are seen to be inversely related. Thus, microenterprises have 
the highest ratio (27.2% in June 2015), followed by small enterprises 
(25.5%) and medium-sized enterprises (20.9%).
In addition to these three developments, a general fall in NPL ratios 
between June 2014 and June 2015, higher NPL ratios for SMEs 
than for large enterprises and the inverse relationship between the 
size of the SME and its NPL ratio, differences are observed between 
firms engaged in construction and real estate activities and other 
non-financial firms (see Charts C and D). In particular, there are 
notable differences between the level of the NPL ratios of SMEs in 
the construction and real-estate activities (35.8% in June 2015) 
and the level of the NPL ratios of other SMEs (16% in June 2015). 
Thus, the decline in the funding of SMEs that engage in construction 
and real-estate activities2 basically involves a reduction in the level 
of risk assumed by the banks that grant credit to SMEs.
BOX 2.1DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NPLS AND NPL RATIOS OF SPANISH DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS BY SIZE OF FIRM
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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1  An enterprise is deemed to be an SME if it satisfies the definition in 
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 (OJ L 124 of 
20.5.03). Thus, an enterprise which employs fewer than 250 persons and 
which has an annual turnover not exceeding €50 million and/or an 
annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million is considered to be 
an SME. In addition, within the SME category, a small enterprise is 
defined as an enterprise which employs fewer than 50 persons and 
whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not 
exceed €10 million, while a microenterprise is defined, in turn, as an 
enterprise which employs fewer than 10 persons and whose annual 
turnover and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed €2 million.
2  Credit for construction and real estate activities accounts for 40% of total 
credit to SMEs in June 2015, while in June 2014 it accounted for 44%.
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Recently, disaggregated information on flows of new non-performing loans has started 
to become available. It showed that new NPLs in the resident private sector in June 2015 
were 40% lower than those recorded in June 2014. This decrease took place both in 
non-financial corporations (–37.7%) and in households (–44.7%, see Chart 2.5.A). 
Between June 2014 and June 2015 €60 billion of new non-performing loans were 
recorded, €27 billion of non-performing loans were written off and recoveries of non-
performing loans exceeded €69 billion (see Chart 2.5.B)
The across-the-board moderation in the rate of fall of credit and, above all, the decrease in 
non-performing loans, enabled the non-performing loans ratio of the resident private sector 
in business in Spain to perform favourably in the past year. In August 2015 (latest available 
data) this ratio stood at 11.2% for deposit institutions as a whole (see Chart 2.6.A).
Sectoral analysis using quarterly data as at June 2015 (the latest available) shows that 
the improvement was across the board (see Chart 2.6.B). Households reduced their 
… and the flow of new NPLs 
as at June 2015 was notably 
lower than a year earlier
The non-performing loans 
ratio performed favourably,…
…decreasing across all 
economic sectors…
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non-performing loans ratio from 6.7% at June 2014 to 5.8% a year later. For their part, 
non-financial corporations saw their non-performing loans ratio decrease by 3.6 pp, 
from 22.6% at June 2014 to 19% a year later. 
In credit to households, the non-performing loans ratio decreased in the past year both in 
house purchase loans (down 0.8 pp to 5%) and in other lending (down 1.6 pp to 9.9%). In 
non-financial corporations, the non-performing loans ratio decreased more steeply for 
construction and real estate development firms (down 5.2 pp to 31.7%) than for other 
firms (down 1.6 pp to 12.7%). 
Foreclosure and forbearance
Foreclosed assets or assets received in payment of debt from business in Spain which are 
held by Spanish banks on their balance sheets decreased slightly in the past year (by 
0.9%) to €81 billion. However, as shown by Chart 2.7.A, the decrease in the last six months 
has been more significant, since in December 2014 the total volume of foreclosed assets 
was €82.5 billion, meaning that in the first half of 2015 it decreased by 2%.
Chart 2.7.B breaks down the total volume of foreclosed assets by type of asset. 35.3% of 
the total is land, the weight of which has decreased by nearly 3 pp in the past year, 24.9% 
are completed buildings (down 1.1 pp in the past year) and 21.5% are foreclosed assets 
arising from house purchases (up 0.5 pp at June 2015 compared with June 2014). Finally, 
buildings under construction amounted to 6.6% of the total at June 2015, up 1.6 pp in the 
past year.
Non-performing loans plus foreclosed assets amount to €224 billion of assets on the 
balance sheet as at June 2015 which do not generate revenue in the income statement. 
These two types of assets, which represent 8.7% of the total assets of banks’ business in 
Spain, put downward pressure on institutions’ income statements, reducing their profit 
generation. 
The total forborne credit at consolidated level amounted to €211 billion as at June 2015. 
Of this total, 52.1% related to non-financial corporations and 45.2% to households. 2.4% 
of the total was credit to general government and the remaining 0.3% was to financial 
firms other than credit institutions. Based on data from individual financial statements, the 
total forborne credit to the resident private sector amounted to €163.8 billion at June 2015, 
…and all loan purposes, both 
in households and in firms.
Foreclosed assets decreased 
slightly in the past year,…
…with land and completed 
buildings predominating
Non-performing loans and 
foreclosed assets are non-
productive assets which put 
pressure on institutions’ profits
Forborne exposures in the 
resident private sector 
decreased by 15.8% in the 
past year to €163.8 billion…
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down 15.8% from the same month a year earlier. This change represents a quickening of 
the fall seen throughout the available time series since March 2014. The decrease in 
forbearance is apparent in the past year both in non-financial corporations (17.5%) and in 
households (13.5%). The weight of forborne exposures in total credit also declined over 
the last few quarters to 13% at June 2015, compared with 14.2% in the same month a 
year earlier (see Chart 2.8 for an analysis by portfolio type).
Within forborne exposures, those classified as non-performing at June 2015 represented 
nearly half of the total (down slightly by 1 pp with respect to the previous year), those 
classed as substandard accounted for 18% and performing loans were 33% of the total, 
having increased by 2 pp between June 2014 and June 2015.
As regards the sectoral distribution of forborne exposures, 64% of them were to firms and 
the other 36% to households. Within the forborne exposures to firms, half were to firms 
engaging in construction and real estate activities and the other half to firms with other 
activities. Of the 35% of forborne exposures to households, 26.2% of the total were for 
house purchase.
Despite the increase in volatility on the international financial markets since the last FSR, 
analysed in Chapter 1 above, the Spanish systemic risk indicator (SRI) has not risen 
significantly in recent months (see Chart 2.9.A). By and large, apart from certain specific 
upswings, the SRI has been contained since end-2013, holding steady in general at low 
levels on all the markets from which it feeds (government debt, securities, money and bank 
funding markets).
Using the CoVaR model3 it is possible to quantify the contribution that Spanish banks 
make to the systemic risk of the euro area as a whole. In comparison with 2014, the 
average CoVaR of Spanish banks has fallen slightly in 2015. However, a small uptick in 
systemic risk at some euro area banks can be observed in 2015, concentrated specifically 
in percentile 5 of the European CoVaR, meaning that the banks affected are essentially 
those with higher systemic risk. To date this minor change has had no significant impact 
on the Spanish bank average.
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Against this backdrop of contained systemic risk indicators, analysis of bank funding at 
consolidated level (see Table 2.1) shows an increase in private sector and central bank 
deposits, while marketable securities decreased as a percentage of funding and general 
government increased slightly. 
Net recourse by Spanish deposit institutions to Eurosystem funding fell by 13% year-on-
year (see Table 2.1), down to €136 billion at September 2015. The weight of Eurosystem 
net lending as a percentage of June total assets decreased to 3.7% at September 2015, 
moving closer to the levels recorded before the start of the tensions on the European 
peripheral sovereign debt market (see Chart 2.10.A).
This is in keeping with the pattern observed among other European banks, in a setting 
characterised by the full allotment policy in Eurosystem regular refinancing operations, in 
force until at least December 2016. Readier access to other funding sources has allowed 
European banks to continue to reduce their bids in new tenders, continuing in the pattern 
that first emerged in the summer of 2012. More recently, a certain degree of stability has 
prevailed and regular refinancing operations have been replaced by targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTROs). Chart 2.10.B, which illustrates the outstanding balance 
of ECB tenders, both for the Eurosystem as a whole and for banks resident in Spain, 
shows no significant changes since the last FSR. In effect, from end-April 2015 (date 
covered by the last FSR) to end-October, gross recourse to the Eurosystem by banks 
resident in Spain fell by €1.7 billion ( 1.2%), while the outstanding balance of the Eurosystem 
as a whole rose by €13.9 billion (2.7%).
As a result, the percentage of total Eurosystem lending received by Spanish banks fell 
slightly in the period. The volume allotted in tenders to banks resident in Spain as a 
percentage of the total provided by the Eurosystem averaged 25.7% at September 2015, 
compared with 26.2% at April. The excess over capital key in the case of Spain has fallen 
by 10 pp from the maximum level observed in mid-2012.
Since the last FSR, activity in the euro area interbank markets has remained weak and has 
even deteriorated further in its various segments, primarily as a consequence of the 
At consolidated level, deposits 
have grown as a percentage 
of bank funding,…
… while recourse by Spanish 
banks to Eurosystem funds 
has declined,…
… as it has at other 
European banks
The percentage of Eurosystem 
lending received by Spanish 
banks fell in the past year
Activity in the various 
segments of the euro area...
SOURCES: Datastream, ECB and Banco de España.
a For a detailed explanation of this indicator, see Box 1.1 in the May 2013 FSR.
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increasingly high excess liquidity in the system. In recent months the volume of Eonia 
trading has fallen sharply, from the already-low levels observed following the downward 
path embarked upon in January 2015. The Spanish interbank market recorded a similar 
performance, with a considerable drop in total volume traded and a much reduced part 
played by the unsecured segment of the market. In terms of the consolidated balance sheet 
(see Table 2.1), this translated into a decline of 4.3% in credit institutions’ deposits, and of 
7.5% in their funding. Accordingly, the net interbank position (credit institutions’ funding 
minus deposits) decreased slightly in terms of total assets, down to 5.5% at June 2015. 
Private sector deposits on the consolidated balance sheet were up 5.6% at June 2015 in 
comparison with a year earlier (see Table 2.1), the reason being the strong growth in this 
heading in business abroad (up more than 20% at June), while business in Spain fell by 
1.5%. As indicated earlier, in the past year exchange rates affected all balance sheet 
headings in business abroad. At consolidated level, lending to the private sector rose by 
4% and deposits of the private sector by 5.6%, triggering, in the past year, a certain 
narrowing of the funding gap in this sector.
Analysis of the deposit market of the resident private sector in Spain shows that deposits 
of households and non-financial corporations declined in the past year: 0.7 year-on-year 
at June 2015, compared with a year-on-year rate of change a year earlier of 1.9% (see 
Chart 2.11.A). When securities issued by deposit institutions to households and non-financial 
corporations are added to deposits, the performance in the past year is similar, although 
with lower rates of change due to the loss of appeal of these products, which to a certain 
extent act as a replacement for retail deposits, in comparison with previous years. 
The poorer performance of deposits of households and non-financial corporations in the 
past year is in response, on the one hand, to interest rates, which in recent years have 
been at historically low levels, making these savings products marketed by banks less 
attractive to deposit customers and, on the other, to the relatively low volatility on financial 
markets. And in consequence, time deposits have shrunk notably in recent years, being 
replaced in part by sight deposits (see Chart 2.11.B).
Net assets of investment funds have continued to grow in 2015, maintaining the pattern 
observed since early 2013. Specifically, at September 2015, the net assets of these funds 
had increased by almost €26 billion in comparison with a year earlier, a growth rate of 
14%. As in previous periods, the main reason for this increase in net assets was the growth 
in net subscriptions (see Chart 2.11.C). 
...interbank markets 
has deteriorated further
Deposits of the private sector 
rose, thanks to business 
abroad, narrowing the funding 
gap somewhat in this sector
In turn, deposits 
of households and 
non-financial corporations 
in Spain declined... 
…in response to interest rates
Net assets of investment 
funds have risen in 2015, 
mainly on the back of higher 
net subscriptions
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Latest data: 29 October 2015.
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Higher volatility on the financial markets and/or a downward overall correction in the value 
of these assets (government debt, corporate bonds, shares, etc.), as interest rates or risk 
premia rise, could reverse the performance in the past year both of (time) deposits and 
investment funds, given their different risk levels.
In the past 12 months, on the back of the performance of loans and deposits of households 
and non-financial corporations in business in Spain, the process of narrowing of deposit 
institutions’ retail funding gap, which commenced in 2007, has continued, albeit more 
moderately (see Chart 2.11.D), in keeping with the pattern, indicated earlier, observed at 
consolidated level.
Marketable securities declined again in the past year, despite the improvement in the 
financial market situation. In recent years there has been a structural shift in the liabilities 
mix of deposit institutions towards funds from the retail sectors and away from wholesale 
funding (see Chart 2.12.A), although this pattern was interrupted at times at the height of 
the crisis (2011 to mid-2012). The decline in the share of deposits in that period of tension 
was largely offset by the increase in ECB funding (see Chart 2.10.A). In any event, Spanish 
deposit institutions have been particularly active in issuance in 2015 to date, most 
Higher volatility could reverse 
the performance of funds and 
deposits, given their different 
risk levels
The funding gap has also 
narrowed in business in Spain
The share of marketable 
securities on the balance 
sheet continued to decline, 
although issues by Spanish 
banks, especially of covered 
bonds, increased
SOURCES: CNMV and Banco de España.
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especially in July (see Chart 2.12.B). There has been a notable increase in covered bonds, 
and not only at the biggest banks as medium-sized institutions have also launched issues 
in 2015, although senior debt issuance has been more limited year-to-date.
Total deposit institution equity was up 6.8% at June 2015 compared with a year earlier 
(see Table 2.1). This strengthened the balance sheet structure in terms of equity, as it grew 
as a percentage of total assets by 0.3 pp, up to 7.3% at the latest date. Own funds rose 
by 8.7%, amounting to 6.8% of total assets at June 2015, reflecting the continued solvency 
improvement at Spanish deposit institutions that began in 2012 (see section 2.3).
In short, Spanish banks have comfortably obtained funding on the financial markets, 
improving their liquidity position and restoring their balance sheet equilibrium, and are now 
well removed from the sharp tensions experienced in 2012. In any event, the risk of 
heightened volatility and asset price fluctuations signalled in Chapter 1 could prompt a 
decline in liquidity in certain markets that could rapidly spread to others. In consequence, 
banks should continue to monitor their liquidity management, not only in the short term but 
also in view of more structural balance sheet changes.
In the first half of 2015, Spanish deposit institutions overall recorded consolidated income 
(attributed to the parent institution) of more than €11 billion, which represented an increase 
of 38.7%, more than €3 billion over the nearly €8 billion recorded in the same period of 2014 
(see Table 2.2). This increase in total income resulted in higher profitability, both in terms of 
the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE). Specifically, ROA increased by 
16 bp, from 0.47% in June 2014 to 0.63% in June 2015. ROE rose by more than 2 pp, from 
7.1% in June 2014 to 9.2% in June of this year, in a context of higher equity at deposit 
institutions overall, as mentioned earlier when discussing Table 2.1. 
However, it should be mentioned that this improvement in consolidated income was 
basically due to activity abroad. As explained in detail in Box 2.2, the profitability margins 
of Spanish institutions at individual level in their domestic business are being pushed 
down by low interest rates (which could remain low for some time) and by the high volume 
of non-performing and foreclosed assets. Activity abroad, which in recent years has 
Total deposit institution equity 
rose, increasing its share of 
the balance sheet
Spanish banks have 
comfortably obtained funding, 
enhancing their liquidity 
position and restoring their 
balance sheet equilibrium
2.2 Profitability
Spanish institutions recorded 
income of more than €11 
billion in the first half of 2015, 
up 38.7% on 2014
The improvement was 
basically due to foreign 
business, as various factors 
exerted downward pressure 
on the business in Spain
SOURCES: Dealogic and Banco de España.
a Senior debt, covered bond and subordinated debt tier I and tier II issues. Retained issues are not included. Latest data: 28 October.
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evolved more favourably than business in Spain, also faces risks. For example, a slowdown 
in the emerging economies could increase the NPL ratio in these countries, and lead to 
their currencies depreciating against the euro, which would reduce their contribution to 
aggregate income, adversely affecting the profitability of the large Spanish banking groups 
with a significant presence abroad. The depreciation of the euro against the dollar and the 
pound sterling would have the opposite effect.
The rise in consolidated profits this year, as compared with the previous year, was due 
both to higher net interest income and to a decrease in the volume of provisions recorded 
for impairment of assets on the balance sheet (see Chart 2.13.A). In June 2015, all margins 
improved (between 10% and 15% year-on-year, see Table 2.2), continuing the growth 
trend following the low levels reached in 2012 (see Chart 2.13.B). Also, the percentage of 
operating income absorbed by impairment losses continued to decrease. Operating 
income has dropped sharply since the peaks recorded in 2012 (see Chart 2.14.A). 
Specific analysis of the main income statement items shows that net interest income in 
the first half of 2015 rose by 10.8% (€3.3 billion) with respect to the previous year. This 
was mainly due to the decrease of 16.5% in financial costs, since financial products 
experienced a much lower decline (1.5%). In the current environment of low interest rates, 
the improvement in net interest income was due to the fact that the fall in the average 
return on investment was lower than that in the average cost of liabilities. This increase in 
net interest income was largely due to foreign business which posted profits that were 
The rise in profits was due 
to higher net interest income 
and the decline in provisions
Net interest income increased 
by 10.8% due to lower 
financial costs, essentially 
arising from foreign business
Jun-14 Jun-15
€m
% Change
Jun-15/Jun-14
% ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 55,254 -1.5 3.32 3.14
Financial costs 21,064 -16.5 1.50 1.20
Net interest income 34,191 10.8 1.83 1.94
Return from capital instruments 806 -12.3 0.05 0.05
dohtem ytiuqe eht gnisu rof detnuocca seititne fo ssol ro tiforp fo erahS 2,175 29.7 0.10 0.12
Net commissions 11,643 4.2 0.66 0.66
seitilibail dna stessa laicnanif no sessol dna sniaG 7,264 3.6 0.42 0.41
Other operating income -409 . -0.08 -0.02
Gross income 55,670 10.8 2.98 3.16
Operating expenses 25,686 7.3 1.42 1.46
Net operating income 29,983 13.9 1.56 1.70
)snoisivorp lareneg dna cificeps( sessol tnemriapmi tessA 12,260 -10.5 0.81 0.70
Provisioning expense (net) 2,619 87.6 0.08 0.15
Operating projt 15,104 34.6 0.67 0.86
Asset impairment losses (assets other than loans and credits) 2,282 0.6 0.13 0.13
Income from disposals (net) 2,149 -37.6 0.20 0.12
Projt before tax 14,972 20.7 0.73 0.85
Net income 12,594 37.1 0.54 0.72
Memorandum item
    Income attributable to the controlling entity 11,020 38.7 0.47 0.63
Jun-15
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT 
Deposit institutions 
TABLE 2.2
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15.3% higher in year-on-year terms. As regards activity in Spain, net interest income also 
increased in the past year, albeit to a lesser extent, as explained in detail in Box 2.2. 
In year-on-year terms, gross income rose by 10.8%, as did net interest income. As with net 
interest income, this improvement was chiefly due to activity abroad. Looking at the main 
items of gross income, both net commissions and gains/losses on financial transactions 
increased by nearly 4%, between the first half of 2014 and the first half of 20154.
Operating expenses also increased in the past year by 7.3%, but to a lesser extent than 
gross income, leading to growth of 13.9% in operating income. The increase in operating 
expenses arose mainly from foreign business which grew by 11.6%, while operating 
expenses on business in Spain grew only slightly (see Box 2.2). Despite the slight growth in 
operating expenses on the activity in Spain (partly owing to the costs arising from integration 
Gross income increased to the 
same extent, due to 
commissions and gains and 
losses on financial assets and 
liabilities
Operating expenses 
increased, but to a lesser 
extent than gross income…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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This box offers a detailed analysis of the income statements of 
Spanish banks in their business in Spain. Although ROE for 
business in Spain has turned positive again, at around 5%, the 
present levels are still very distant from the usual levels of the mid-
2000s or the late-1990s (see Panel A) and are below the cost of 
capital1. This poses a challenge for Spanish banks in respect of 
their present business model.
The main pressures on income statements in business in Spain 
are the prevailing low interest rates in the euro area (which could 
BOX 2.2LOW PROFITABILITY FOR DEPOSIT-TAKING INSTITUTIONS IN THE BANKING BUSINESS IN SPAIN
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Marginal interest rates refer to those established in transactions initiated or renewed in the previous reference month. The transactions are weighted according 
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1  The ECB estimates the current cost of capital at 8%-10% for most banks 
in the euro area; see Box 5 of the Financial Stability Review, May 2015. 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201505.
en.pdf?3cd887eb74f562fc8db70554df5b01ca.
processes which have continued in the first six months of 2015, although less intensely than 
in previous periods), the capacity adjustment process continued in recent months, through 
cut-backs in offices and employees (see Chart 2.14.B). This chart shows the scale of cut-
backs in branches and staff in the Spanish banking sector as a result of the crisis. Currently, 
the number of branches and employees is lower than it was at the beginning of the process 
of deregulation at the end of the 1980s. Naturally, in part, this situation also reflects the 
increase in productivity arising from the use of new technologies in the banking sector.
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continue for some time), the still-low level of activity and the 
significant volume of non-productive assets (non-performing 
loans and foreclosed assets) on banks’ balance sheets. Pressure 
on income statements owing to the low interest rate scenario, in 
response to a euro area inflation rate that is below the ECB’s 
target rate, affects not only Spanish banks but also most 
European banks, as do the other two factors, although with 
varying intensity by country. In Spain, as Panel B shows, interest 
rates on assets and liabilities in the banking sector are at 
historically low levels.
To describe the latest income performance, analysis of the various 
elements that make up the income statement is appropriate. Net 
interest income on business in Spain rose by 4.2% in the past year 
(see Table A), as a result of the decline in financial costs (35.6%) 
that outpaced the drop in financial revenue (17.1%).
However, as Panel C shows, in the past year changes in the 
composition of balance sheets were the main reason for the 
growth in net interest income. Notably the low rate of remuneration 
of time deposits has meant that they are being replaced by sight 
deposits (see Chart 2.11.B) which are less costly for banks.
The price effect on net interest income as a result of the average 
interest rates on assets and liabilities has been negative, owing to 
the already very low average remuneration of liabilities, where there 
is increasingly less room for manoeuvre, and to a lesser extent to 
the fiercer competition on the asset side. Thus, in recent months, 
BOX 2.2LOW PROFITABILITY FOR DEPOSIT-TAKING INSTITUTIONS IN THE BANKING BUSINESS IN SPAIN (cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a This income statement is referred to institutions obliged to report own funds.
Jun-14 Jun-15
€m
% Change
Jun-15/Jun-14
% ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 21,850 -17.1 2.10 1.73
Financial costs 9,114 -35.6 1.13 0.72
Net interest income 12,736 4.2 0.97 1.01
Net commissions 5,329 1.1 0.42 0.42
seitilibail dna stessa laicnanif no sessol dna sniaG 4,727 -20.8 0.48 0.38
Gross income 27,248 -4.3 2.27 2.16
Operating expenses 12,408 1.0 0.98 0.98
Net operating income 14,840 -8.3 1.29 1.18
)snoisivorp lareneg dna cificeps( sessol tnemriapmi tessA 8,393 -17.2 0.81 0.67
Net income 5,748 3.2 0.44 0.46
Jun-15
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BOX 2.2LOW PROFITABILITY FOR DEPOSIT-TAKING INSTITUTIONS IN THE BANKING BUSINESS IN SPAIN (cont’d)
the decline in marginal rates on new asset transactions has been 
somewhat more marked than on new liabilities (see Panel D). 
The sustainability of net interest income when the interest rate 
differential is so narrow largely depends on there being a sufficiently 
high level of activity. At present, this is not the case. In fact the impact 
of the activity level (the volume effect) was also negative in the past 
year, albeit smaller in absolute terms than in the previous year. 
Gross income from business in Spain fell by 4.3% in year-on-year 
terms, as a result of the sharp decline in gains on financial 
transactions (20.8%) and the decrease in dividends received on 
investments in capital instruments. Gains from the sale of financial 
assets fell compared with the first half of 2014 and 2013, although 
they remain higher than those recorded in previous years. 
Net commissions rose slightly in the past year (1.1%), although not 
sufficiently to offset the sharp fall in gains on financial transactions, 
hence the decline in gross income. In any event, net commissions 
were affected by the contrasting performance of two elements: on 
the one hand, commissions from the sale of non-bank financial 
products and from securities services, which rose in keeping with 
the higher demand for these products given the low interest rate 
environment; and on the other, commissions from collection and 
payment services, which are more closely linked to bank activity 
and which declined (see Panel E).
Operating expenses in business in Spain increased somewhat in 
year-on-year terms (1%); however, as indicated in the body of the 
Report, they remain contained as a result of the reduction in both 
branch and staff numbers (see Chart 2.14.B), a process that is 
expected to continue for some time yet and to permit further 
efficiency gains. Nevertheless, efficiency gains from cost savings 
are constrained by the need to contain operating risks and, in 
particular, IT risks.
Accordingly, in certain cases, it may be appropriate to consider 
possible mergers or acquisitions in order to achieve the efficiency 
gains suggested on a sustained basis.
Asset impairment losses have continued to decline ( 17.2% year-
on-year) and, as a result, net income from business in Spain has 
finally improved slightly, up 3.2% (€175 million) at June 2015 on a 
year earlier. Nevertheless, despite this drop in impairment losses, 
and as already indicated, the high volume of non-performing 
exposure on banks’ balance sheets puts further pressure on 
income statements, since it makes no positive contribution, but it 
consumes resources and entails provisioning costs (loss of value) 
and maintenance costs. The high volume of non-productive 
assets, comprising NPLs and foreclosed assets, which causes this 
increased pressure on income statements, along with the ratio of 
NPLs and foreclosed assets as a proportion of credit to the 
resident private sector, are depicted in Panel F.
As gross income increased at a higher rate than operating expenses, the efficiency ratio 
(operating expenses divided by gross income) improved, standing at 46.1% in June 2015, 
1.5 pp lower compared with the same period in 2014. However, the less favourable 
performance of gross income from business in Spain has led to a decline in the efficiency 
ratio of business in Spain in the last twelve months.
Asset impairment losses (specific and general provisions) continued to decline (see 
Chart 2.14.A) from the peaks recorded in 2012 (the year Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 
18/2012 were applied), partly as a result of the decrease in the NPL ratio mentioned in 
section 2.1.1. In year-on-year terms, asset impairment losses fell by 10.5% in June 2015 
(nearly €1.5 billion). This decline was due to business in Spain, since for foreign business, 
financial asset impairment losses increased in the past year. In fact, the significant 
decline in the level of these provisions in Spain contributed very favourably to ensuring 
that income from business in Spain also improved with respect to last year. Losses 
arising from the impairment of assets other than loans and credits (including provisions 
to cover the decline in value of foreclosed assets) remained relatively constant (with 
growth of 0.6%) as compared with the previous year. 
In short, in the first half of 2015, total consolidated income of Spanish deposit institutions 
continued the recovery initiated in 2013. All income categories, including interest 
income, improved by more than 10% on the previous year, owing to the fact that the 
average cost of liabilities decreased more than the average return on assets. Thus, in 
… enhancing institutions’ 
efficiency ratio
Asset impairment losses 
continued the downward trend 
which had begun in 2012.
In short, in the first half 
of 2015, total consolidated 
income of Spanish deposit 
institutions continued...
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line with the trend of recent quarters, the more favourable behaviour of NPLs meant 
lower asset impairment provisions, which, in turn, contributed to boosting income. 
However, despite this improvement on the results of previous years, the current profits 
are at historically low levels, since the low interest rate environment, low activity and 
still-high levels of non-performing assets put pressure on the income statements of the 
institutions in Spain.
In recent months, the stock market behaviour of listed Spanish institutions has been less 
favourable than that of its European peers (see Chart 2.15.A). The ratio of market value to 
book value for Spanish banks, although still slightly higher than that of the main European 
banks declined with respect to these banks over the current year (see Chart 2.15.B).
At June 2015 the top-quality capital ratio, common equity tier 1 (CET1), of Spanish deposit 
institutions stood at 12.4%, more than 80 bp higher than at June 2014 (see Chart 2.16). 
The capital increases made in late 2014 and early 2015 at Spain’s two largest banks are 
the main reason for this growth. Thus, aggregate CET1 is comfortably above the regulatory 
minimum of 4.5%5. 
The total capital ratio stood at 14.3% at June 2015, posting a similar increase to the CET1 
ratio in the past year. In turn, the tier 1 capital ratio (which adds additional tier 1 capital to 
CET1), stood at virtually the same level as the CET1 ratio (12.4%) at June 2015, owing to 
the effect of gradual transitional adjustments, particularly in relation to deductions6. Both 
capital ratios are comfortably above the respective regulatory minimum levels of 8% and 
...the recovery initiated 
in 2013, although profitability 
continues to be a risk factor.
The stock market behaviour 
of Spanish institutions has 
been less favourable than that 
of its European peers in recent 
months
2.3 Solvency
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a The average of Spanish banks is calculated by taking all the Spanish banks listed at each date, while the average of European banks is calculated by taking all the 
main European banks.
5  The capital conservation buffer will be phased in from 1 January 2016. This will raise the capital requirements by 
0.625% each year, up to the definitive CET1 level of 7% in 2019. In addition, also from 2016, all institutions, 
including those directly supervised by the SSM (more than 90% of the Spanish banking system), will have to 
comply with the minimum capital requirement under Pillar 2 as well as Pillar 1, as a result of supervisory 
discretion, and these requirements may overlap with some of the existing capital buffers.
6  The ratios take into account the transitional adjustments that facilitate the gradual implementation of Basel III. 
The implementation timetable specifies generally that, in 2015, only 40% of total deductions are to be subtracted 
from common equity, with the remaining 60% being deducted from additional tier 1 capital. In quantitative terms, 
the main transitional adjustments relate to deductions of intangible assets, and, secondly, to deductions of 
deferred tax assets based on future income.
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6%. In absolute terms, CET1 rose by more than €17 billion in the past year, reaching 
almost €210 billion at June 2015. In turn, the total capital volume rose by slightly more 
(€19 billion) to €240 billion at June 2015 (see Chart 2.17.A).
Common equity tier 1 accounts for the bulk of own funds (87%); the remainder are mainly 
tier 2 capital (see Chart 2.17.B). This breakdown of own funds has been practically constant 
throughout the past year.
Regarding the composition of common equity tier 1, insofar as eligible elements are 
concerned, capital instruments are the main component (47%), followed in quantitative 
terms by reserves (30%). Accordingly, these two elements account for more than 75% of 
eligible elements of CET1; transitional adjustments (17%) and minority interests and other 
(6%) complete the list. There was no material change in the relative significance of the 
eligible elements of CET1 in the past year, although the proportion of capital instruments 
declined slightly while that of reserves and transitional adjustments rose. Deductions 
decreased in the past year, but the bulk (60%) continued to be deductions from goodwill 
and other intangible assets. Deductions from deferred tax assets dropped to 16%, falling 
below other deductions (24%) in quantitative terms. Chart 2.17.C depicts the CET1 
structure in terms of risk-weighted assets (RWAs).
Lastly, risk-weighted assets (RWAs), the denominator of the capital ratios, amounted to 
more than €1,681 billion at June 2015, an increase of 1.8% on a year earlier. Nevertheless, 
given that the total assets of Spain’s deposit institutions rose at a faster pace, as a 
percentage of total assets RWAs fell by almost 1 pp to 46%. The make-up of RWAs 
changed very little in the past year: the main component is credit and counterparty risk 
(86%)7, followed by operational risk (9%) and position, foreign exchange and commodity 
risks (4%), while all other risks amount to less than 1% of RWAs (see Chart 2.17.D). In 
addition, there was no material change in the volume of exposures subject to the 
standardised approach or the internal ratings based (IRB) approach, or in the relative 
density (the ratio between risk-weighted assets and total exposure) of either approach 
by portfolio.
The bulk of own funds is CET1
Capital and reserves 
are the two main components 
of CET1 
Risk-weighted assets 
rose by 1.8%, but fell as 
a percentage of total assets 
to 46%
7  Credit and counterparty risk is that arising from credit exposures, equity exposures and securitisation positions 
and includes that calculated using RWAs obtained by both the standardised approach and the IRB approach.
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All the foregoing shows that Spanish banks continued to reinforce their solvency so as to 
be able to face potential risks such as those signalled throughout this Report. This is 
reflected not only in the enhanced solvency ratios (according to any definition), but also in 
the absolute increase in own funds, accompanied by a slight increase in RWAs.
In short, Spain’s banks 
continued to reinforce their 
solvency so as to be able 
to face potential risks
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CHART 2.17
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3  OTHER MATTERS. DEFERRED TAX ASSETS
This chapter describes the treatment of deferred tax assets (DTAs) under existing tax and 
bank solvency law, and also outlines the recent changes to this law.
DTAs represent a right to pay less tax in relation to future tax declarations. There are two 
types of DTA: those arising from temporary differences and credits for tax losses. A DTA 
arising from temporary differences arises as a consequence of the different criteria used by 
the accounting and fiscal frameworks when determining the precise moment at which a 
particular expense may be recognised. For example, there are certain provisions that under 
the accounting framework are considered expenses at the time they are incurred, but which 
under the tax framework are not accepted as such until a later date. In this case, the profit 
obtained by the firm calculated under the accounting framework will be lower than that 
calculated under the tax framework, the latter being the one to which the tax rate is applied 
to determine the tax payable.
That difference between the tax that would have to be paid on accounting profit and the tax 
that is actually paid is what is recorded as a DTA arising from temporary differences. When 
on a future date the tax framework considers the expense admissible, the opposite effect 
will occur: the accounting profit will be greater than the taxable profit, and the DTA arising 
from temporary differences will be derecognised.
The other type of DTA is credits for tax losses: firms may offset against the taxable profits 
obtained in one year the tax losses recorded in previous years, before determining the 
amount of tax payable. Until tax losses have been offset a DTA in respect of credit for tax 
losses is recorded in the balance sheet. When in a future year the firm obtains profits and 
offsets the losses, the DTA will be derecognised.
Groups of significant credit institutions, those that are directly supervised by the SSM, had 
€68,464 million of deferred tax assets net of tax liabilities as at 31 December 2014. These 
significant amounts of DTAs are largely explained by the restrictive nature of the accounting 
and tax regulations applicable in Spain:
i)  Tax law does not recognise various items that are recorded as expenses in the 
accounting statements as tax deductible expenses. In the case of credit 
institutions, typical examples are the general provisions they are obliged to set 
aside, which are mostly considered not to be tax deductible expenses, and 
provisions for collateralised contingencies.
ii)  The restrictive nature of tax law is reinforced by its interaction with accounting 
law, which is also very demanding. This interaction is especially noteworthy in 
the case of provisions. As a consequence of the accounting regulations 
applicable to the banking sector, Spanish credit institutions normally set aside 
a very high volume of provisions in comparison with the firms of other sectors 
and the institutions of other countries. These requirements were significantly 
increased by the extraordinary provisions for the real estate sector that were 
established in order to rebuild credit institutions’ balance sheets (Royal Decree 
Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012).
Deferred tax assets are 
a right to pay less tax in future. 
There are two types: 
temporary differences 
generated by differences 
between tax and accounting 
criteria, and …
… credits for tax losses
The volume of DTAs 
exceeded €68 billion in 
December 2014, because …
…Spanish tax regulations 
are very restrictive as 
regards the admissibility 
of tax expenses, and…
…Spanish accounting 
regulations are very 
demanding, for instance 
in the case of provisions
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The combination of higher provisioning requirements with a lower acceptance of such 
provisions as tax expenses largely explains the existence of significant volumes of DTAs on 
the balance sheets of Spanish credit institutions.
In order to ensure these claims are recoverable against the tax authorities, thereby 
strengthening the equity of Spanish companies that pay corporate income tax, irrespective 
of their size, legal form, characteristics, activity or the economic sector in which they 
operate, a change to the Corporate Income Tax Law1 was introduced by Royal Decree
Law 14/2013. This reform established mechanisms to guarantee the recovery of the 
amount of certain DTAs arising from temporary differences (DTAs covered by this 
guarantee are normally called “deferred tax credits” (DTCs)). Briefly, the main aspects of 
this guarantee are:
i) It allows, subject to the limits described below, the amounts to which the new 
rule refers to be set off against other tax debts, or else to be refunded.
ii)  This mechanism does not apply to all DTAs, only those arising from temporary 
differences. Moreover, it only covers temporary differences generated by two 
items: provisions for loan losses or foreclosed assets, or pension commitment 
expenses.
iii)  Not only is the scope of the mechanism restrictive, but also the cases in which 
it would be activated: in the event of insolvency or winding up of the company, it 
would be fully activated, and, if there are accounting losses, it would be limited to 
the percentage of the company’s own funds that the losses represent. In addition, 
if the DTCs are not reversed within 18 years, they may be exchanged for 
government securities.
As regards their impact on credit institutions, any reasonable estimate leads to the 
conclusion that the probability of occurrence of any of the situations that would trigger a 
refund of DTCs by the tax authorities with a significant impact on government tax revenues 
is very low. This conclusion is based on the restrictive nature of the mechanism as regards 
the temporary differences covered and events that would activate it, the latter being very 
unlikely to occur, as historical experience shows. Consequently, it will continue to be 
normal for DTCs to be recovered naturally, by being claimed as a tax expense in the year 
in which they become deductible.
Although the foreseeable impact of the refunding of DTCs by the tax authorities to credit 
institutions is very limited, there is a significant effect insofar as the determination of 
regulatory capital is concerned. The new European solvency legislation (CRR), which came 
into force in January 2014, introduced a new requirement for deferred tax assets of banks 
that are dependent on future profitability to be deducted from regulatory capital (specifically 
the highest quality capital, CET1). This change in the solvency legislation entailed a 
significant change in the relevance of the DTAs on Spanish credit institutions’ balance 
sheets when their solvency is assessed.
The tax legislation that introduced mechanisms for recovering certain DTAs allowed the 
potential impact of DTAs on capital ratios to be mitigated. As mentioned above, the CRR 
To ensure the recording 
in the accounts of tax credits, 
mechanisms are established 
to ensure that DTAs arising 
from temporary differences 
are used
Both the activation conditions 
and the scope of the 
mechanism are restrictive …
…so that the probability that 
DTCs will have a significant 
impact on government tax 
revenues is very low
The CRR establishes that the 
deferred tax assets of banks 
that are dependent on future 
profitability are deducted 
from CET1
The tax legislation that 
introduced mechanisms... 
1  The previous law on corporate income tax has recently been replaced by Law 27/2014, which includes the mechanisms 
that guarantee the ability to recover certain DTAs, in similar terms to the previous law.
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requires that DTAs that are dependent on future profitability be deducted from capital. 
However, for DTCs to be recoverable it is no longer necessary for the credit institution to 
earn profits in future. For this reason, the CRR does not require DTCs to be deducted when 
the capital ratio is calculated.
European state aid legislation and amendment of Spanish tax legislation
Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources that distorts competition by favouring certain companies or the 
production of certain goods shall be incompatible with the single market insofar as it affects 
trade between Member States.
The European Commission has issued requests for information to the Spanish government, 
as it has to the governments of other EU countries with similar laws, in relation to those 
DTAs that do not reduce banks’ capital. As a result of these requests, it was agreed that 
the Corporate Income Tax Law would be amended, by means of the 2016 State Budget 
Law, to ensure that the fiscal rules regarding DTCs are compatible with European law on 
state aid.
The planned amendment is based on a distinction drawn between the different types of 
DTCs, according to whether they are generated in periods in which tax has been paid:
i)  Type 1: DTCs that have triggered higher tax payments in the period (the 
temporary difference arises as a consequence of accounting expenses that 
are not accepted as tax expenses, which implies a higher tax base and a 
higher tax payment).
ii)  Type 2: all other DTCs where, although the temporary difference means that 
taxable profit is higher than accounting profit, the institution records a 
negative taxable income (tax losses), or where, although a positive taxable 
income is recorded, it is not sufficient to cover all the DTCs generated, so no 
tax is actually paid.
This distinction draws from the idea that in the case of type 1 DTCs, the institution has 
prepaid tax, having been unable to take a tax credit against part of the accounting expense, 
so these DTCs simply guarantee that firms will be able to recover tax paid in excess.
Accordingly, the change to tax legislation focuses on type 2 DTCs, specifically on three 
aspects, leaving the essential characteristics of the arrangements unaltered (there is no 
change to the sources of the temporary differences that may be guaranteed or to the events 
that would trigger that guarantee).
The first change only affects temporary differences susceptible to conversion into DTCs 
that are generated from 2016. The new tax regulations establish that the guarantee 
arrangements will only cover temporary differences arising from provisions for loan losses 
or foreclosed assets, or pension commitment expenses, up to the limit of the tax actually 
paid in that financial year. This means that from 2016, guarantees will only be provided to 
new DTCs if they are type 1 (it will not be possible to generate type 2 DTCs).
If the net tax payable in a financial year is higher than the temporary differences that may 
generate a DTC in that year, the excess may be used to consider as type 1 DTCs temporary 
...for the recovery of certain 
DTAs allowed their potential 
impact on capital ratios 
to be mitigated
The European Commission 
has issued requests 
for information, as a result 
of which tax legislation has 
been amended to ensure 
its compatibility with EU 
law on state aid
Two types of DTC are 
distinguished:
DTCs that have triggered 
higher tax payments 
(type 1) and …
… all other DTCs (type 2), 
where three changes are made 
to the regulations
First, from 2016, guarantees 
will only be provided to new 
DTCs if they are type 1
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differences arising from provisions for loan losses or foreclosed assets, or pension 
commitment expenses from previous financial years (including from the stock at 31
December 2015) or from the following two financial years (which in the calculation of the 
respective year were classed as type 2 DTCs). 
The second change introduces a way to deal with the existing volume of DTCs at 31 
December 2015. If an institution decides to keep the guarantee, it will cover the full amount 
of DTCs (irrespective of whether they are type 1 or type 2), but in exchange the institution 
will have to pay an annual consideration of 1.5% on the part of that amount that relates to 
type 2 DTCs.
The amount on which the consideration is payable will initially be calculated as the 
difference between the DTCs generated in the tax periods 2008 to 2015 and the aggregate 
sum of the net tax payable in that period. In future years that amount may be reduced, as 
a consequence of reversal of the constituent temporary differences or by operation of the 
arrangement described above. The first tax period for which the annual consideration will 
be payable is 2016. 
Lastly, the third change, made to counterbalance the introduction of a new consideration, 
is that the guarantee arrangement will no longer be automatic but voluntary. Institutions will 
have to either accept the guarantee (and pay the consideration) or reject it; if they accept 
the guarantee it will remain indefinitely until such time as there are no DTC balances.
Based on data at 31 December 2014, the main Spanish groups of credit institutions (those 
supervised by the SSM) had deferred tax assets net of tax liabilities amounting to €68,464 
million, of which €44,287 million were DTCs (of which €41,468 million generated in Spain). 
Of the latter it is estimated that €27,924 million are type 2 DTCs (see Chart 3.1); charging a 
consideration of 1.5% on those DTCs would entail an outlay of €419 million by institutions.
It should be noted that the consideration will gradually decrease, since it is calculated on 
type 2 DTCs that will gradually be eliminated, as the new tax legislation precludes the 
creation of new type 2 DTCs. As the volume of type 2 DTCs remaining declines, so will 
the consideration payable.
Second, an annual 
consideration of 1.5% will 
be paid for type 2 DTCs 
existing at end-2015
Third, the guarantee 
arrangement will no longer 
be automatic but voluntary
Institutions will pay 
a consideration 
of 1.5% for the guarantee
The consideration 
will decrease 
as type 2 DTCs 
are gradually eliminated
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a DTA: deferred tax assets. DTC: guaranteed DTA.
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